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THE LAW OF CONTINUING CARE FACILITIES
IN NORTH CAROLINA
HARRY E. GROVES*
With effect from January 1, 1988, the North Carolina legislature ad-
ded to Chapter 13 1E Health Care Facilities and Services a new Article
12, "Disclosure and Contract Requirements for Continuing Care Facili-
ties." This new legislation recognized a fast-growing industry in North
Carolina1 and the need for legislative intervention to protect the rights of
the aged residents of these facilities.
"Continuing Care Facilities" is one of a number of synonyms for the
same entities. In some states they are called "Life Care Facilities,"2 in
others "Continuing Care Retirement Communities."3 The characteristic
which they have in common is that they offer to persons of retirement
age a home with the availability, normally within the structures of the
facility, of comprehensive medical care. The facilities are not designed
for the poor. The entry fee, which purchases a life estate in particular
quarters, often exceeds one hundred thousand dollars and the monthly
service charge frequently exceeds seven hundred dollars per person. The
purchase agreement varies with the facilities as do the services offered for
the monthly fee. In some the purchase price for the life estate is forfeited
on the death or departure of the resident. In others the purchase price,
or some part of it, may be recovered by the resident on departure or by
his/her estate upon the resident's death. The quarters purchased may be
a separate house, an attached house or an apartment, depending upon the
facility.4
The monthly fee purchases health care, usually with certain limita-
tions. A resident may receive all routine out-patient medical care on the
premises. In the event of short-term illnesses he will normally have avail-
* Henry Brandis Professor of Law Emeritus, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. Development in North Carolina reflects that in the nation, the American Association of
Homes for the Aging's "Guidelines for Regulation of Continuing Care Retirement Communities,"
dated May, 1987, reports on page 1 that there are now approximately 600 continuing care retirement
communities, a figure which has doubled in the past ten years and is expected to more than double
again in the current decade.
2. Eg., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1801 (Supp. 1987); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111-1/2 4160
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
3. Eg., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6202(2) (Supp. 1988).
4. See WINXLEVOSS & POWELL, Continuing Care Retirement Communitie" An Empirical,
Financial, and Legal Analysis, 1984, WHARTON SCH. 11.
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able on premises a clinic with full nursing services. Operations are gener-
ally not performed in the clinic but are usually paid for by the facility,
utilizing the resident's medicare eligibility and any other insurance of the
resident, with the facility paying any excess costs. Stays in the clinic,
without additional cost to the resident, may be limited to a number of
days per year, e.g., thirty. For stays of greater length, the resident may
be charged a daily rate comparable to that of nursing homes. Residents
often pay for their medications. In some facilities the contract of life care
may exclude communicable diseases and/or serious mental conditions,
such as Alzheimer's disease.
The monthly fee also normally provides for one meal a day. The living
units have their own separate kitchens as in any apartment or house.
Other meals may be purchased in the facility's dining room. Maid ser-
vice is usually a part of the contract and a variety of other services may
be offered, such as recreational events, transportation to stores and places
of recreation, etc.
In addition to being able to afford entry and therefore ranging from the
middle class to wealthy, residents share other characteristics. They are,
of course, elderly. While entry in the sixties is usually permitted, obser-
vation reveals that the majority of residents are in their seventies and
above. Most people do not normally elect to leave their homes for com-
munal living until infirmity of body or ill health makes independent liv-
ing infeasible. Many of the residents will have found that the act of
severing community ties, selling of a loved residence and disposing of
many of the furnishings and other possessions for which there is no room
in the new and smaller residence has been traumatic. For many these
painful acts have followed upon the loss of a mate. Often the surviving
spouse is not the one who has handled the business affairs of the family.
Thus while this is a class of people who have known independence and
some affluence, they can be expected to number many who need the pro-
tection that only the state can afford. An aged person, perhaps trauma-
tized by the loss of a mate, often not in good health, may be only
theoretically in a position of bargaining equality with a Continuing Care
provider.
Continuing care facilities are a rapid growth industry and not just in
the sunbelt states, although California and Florida have, as might be ex-
pected, had some of the longest experience of regulation in this field.5
Currently, statutes in some form addressed to these matters are found in
twenty-six states, with many of the enactments being quite recent.
The North Carolina statute is a disclosure, not a licensing, statute.
This contrasts with a number of states, including some with the longest
5. Florida, for example, began to regulate the industry in 1953. See PATRUCCO, Florida's
Continuing Care Contracts, 61 FLA. B. J. 29 (1987).
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experience with these facilities. In Arizona a permit to enter into life
care contracts must be secured from the Department of Insurance.6 A
similar requirement is found in the laws of Colorado,7 Florida,8 Maine,9
Missouri,1° Pennsylvania," Texas, 2 Virginia,' 3 Wisconsin. 4 and New
Hampshire. 5 In Vermont, it is the Department of Banking and Insur-
ance. 6 Kansas, which does not require a license, does require the filing
with the state insurance commissioner of an annual disclosure statement
and audit.' The logic of close supervision, including licensing, by a
state's Department of Insurance is compelling. What residents think and
hope that they are purchasing with the substantial initial expenditure and
monthly fee is in reality a new type of insurance, guaranteeing their
maintenance for life. For many, the initial purchase represents the sur-
render of substantially all of their capital assets, often derived from the
sale of their home. For many the financial collapse of a continuing care
facility would be even more devastating than the failure of a life insur-
ance company. Failure of the latter might merely deprive heirs of an
expectation. Failure of a continuing care facility could result in impover-
ishment in old age.
Some other states which do not place licensing authority in a depart-
ment of insurance do require a permit of some other agency of govern-
ment. In California it is the Department of Social Services," in Illinois
the Department of Public Health,19 in Indiana the Securities Commis-
sion,20 in Connecticut and Maryland the Department of Aging,2" in Lou-
isiana and Michigan Department of Commerce,22 and in New Jersey the
Department of Community Affairs.2" It is apparent from their titles that
all of these licensing agencies have a reasonable nexus to the subject mat-
ter of continuing care communities. The comprehensiveness of the su-
pervision inherent in the licensing of all these agencies will be discussed
infra.
6. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1801 (Supp. 1987).
7. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-101 (1985).
8. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.021 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
9. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6202(2) (Supp. 1988).
10. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 376.905 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
11. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3204 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
12. Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726 § 4 (Vernon 1987).
13. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-4901 (1986).
14. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 647.02 (West Supp. 1988).
15. N.H. Rev. St. Ann. § 420-D:2 (Supp. 1988).
16. Vt. Stat. Ann: tit. 8, § 8001 (Supp. 1988)
17. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16-1104 (Supp. 1987).
18. Cal. Health and Safety Code, § 1770 (West 1988).
19. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 111-1/2 4160-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
20. Ind. Code Ann. § 23-24-3 (Bums Supp. 1988).
21. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-537 (West Supp. 1988); Md. Ann. Art. 70B § 8 (Supp. 1987).
22. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2174 (West 1987); Mich. Stat. Ann. J § 14.1301(8) (Calahan 1987).
23. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-333 (West Supp. 1987).
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It will be seen from the above two paragraphs that of the twenty-six
states that have legislated on continuing care communities, nineteen do
not permit a provider to enter into the business except with the permis-
sion of the state. The remaining seven states, of which North Carolina is
one, require only disclosure by the provider of certain relevant informa-
tion [discussed in detail infra].
All of the license states also require disclosure, demanding varying de-
grees of detail. In every case disclosure is required to the state.24 In ten,
specific disclosure is also required to both prospective purchasers and
current residents.2" Five licensing states that require disclosure to pro-
spective purchasers make no similar provisions for residents.26 Neither
Michigan nor Florida orders disclosure by the provider to either prospec-
tive purchasers or residents; but in Michigan the disclosure documents
filed with the bureau are open to public inspection27 and persons may
secure photostatic copies of them.2" In Florida the act requires that
records of all cost and inspection reports filed with or issued by any gov-
ernment agency be maintained as public information and be available
upon request.29 The statute of Maryland requires that the State Office on
Aging publicize the availability of the disclosure information and make it
available to all interested persons.30
The theory for the requirement of disclosure as to prospective purchas-
ers is, of course, that if they have detailed information about the assets,
liabilities, operating income and expenses, and the personal and profes-
sional history of major persons connected with the provider, they can
make an informed decision as to entry into a contract with the provider.
24. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1802 (1987); Cal. Health and Safety Code § 1771.4 to 1771.8
(West Supp. 1988); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-102 (1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17-536 (1988); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 651.022 (West 1988); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 111-1/2 4160-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Ind.
Code Ann. § 23-2-4-4 (Burns 1984); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2174(B) (West Supp. 1988); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6203 (Supp. 1987); Md. Ann. Code art. 70B § 10 (Supp. 1987); Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 14.1301(8) (Calahan 1987); Mo. Stat. §§ 376.915 and 376.920 (Vernon Supp. 1988); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:4; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52-27D-333 (West Supp. 1987); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40
§ 3207(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987); Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726 § 5(a)(1) (Vernon 1987); Va. Code
Ann. § 38.1-956 (1985); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8010 (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 647.02 (West
1987).
25. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-108 (1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-537 and 17-543 (West
1988); Ind. Code Ann. § 23-2-4-7 (Burns 1984); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2176(B) (West 1988); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6206 (1978); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 376.930 (Vernon 1988); N.J. Stat. Ann.
52:27D-336 and 337 (West 1987); 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3207(c) (Purdon 1987); Va. Code Ann.
§ 38.1-958 and 959 (1985); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8010 (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 647.04(b)
(West 1987).
26. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1812 (Supp. 1987); Cal. Health and Safety Code § 1779 (West
Supp. 1988); IlM. Ann. Stat. ch. 111-1/2 4160 (Sniith-Hurd 1987); Tex. Health & Safety Ann. § 726
(Vernon 1987); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8010 (Supp. 1988).
27. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.1301(40) (Calaghan 1987).
28. Id. at § 14.1301(41).
29. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.091 (West 1984).
30. Md. Ann. Code art. 70B § 10(f) (Supp. 1987).
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1988], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol17/iss2/3
THE LAW OF CONTINUING CARE FACILITIES
The limited options available in many states to one who has already en-
tered into a life contract may well account for the failure of some statutes
to require disclosure to current residents.
Most of the disclosure-only states require that the disclosure informa-
tion be filed with some state agency. In North Carolina that agency is
the Division of Family Services of the Department of Human Re-
sources; 31 in Connecticut it is the Department on Aging;32 in Kansas, as
noted above, it is the State Insurance Commission; in New Mexico the
State Agency on Aging; 33 in Rhode Island the Department of Health.
34
In Minnesota the disclosure statement must be filed in the office of the
county recorder of the county in which the facility is or will be located.35
Two of the disclosure states, Massachusetts and Oregon, do not require a
public filing of a disclosure statement.
The fact that a permit or license is not required by a state does not
necessarily mean that the state exercises no control over the provider.
Even the non-filing state of Oregon permits a purchaser to rescind the
contract of purchase within six years if the seller fails to supply the pro-
spective purchasers with the mandated disclosure statement, makes an
untrue statement of a material fact or fails to state a necessary material
fact. The statute further makes personally jointly and severally liable to
the purchaser every person who directly or indirectly controls the seller.
Curiously, members of the board of directors are excluded from liability
by the statute. 36 Oregon does not prescribe any of the terms of the con-
tract. Massachusetts, a non-filing state, does prescribe terms of the con-
tract and gives the resident the right of recision and full refund of the
entrance fee if the contract violates any of the mandated provisions.37
With one exception, Connecticut, it is the pattern in the disclosure-
only filing states that the agency with which the disclosure statement is
filed exercises no direct supervision over the provider. Kansas neither
supervises the provider nor addresses the question of any civil liability;
the statute does state that a provider who fails to comply with the provi-
sions of the act, shall be fined not more than $500 upon conviction.38
The statute is silent as to the machinery of enforcement of the criminal
penalty. It should be noted that the Kansas statute consists of only one
printed page. The more detailed statutes of Minnesota and New Mexico
appear to have provided some of the model for the North Carolina stat-
31. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-216 (1987).
32. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17-536 (West 1988).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-17-7 (1986).
34. R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-59-1 (1985).
35. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80D.03 (West 1986).
36. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 105.835 (1983).
37. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 76 (West 1984).
38. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16-1105 (Supp. 1987).
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ute. The New Mexico statute make§ civilly liable a provider who has not
delivered to the prospective purchaser a disclosure statement or whose
statement misstates or omits a material fact. The purchaser is entitled to
damages and a return of all fees, less the reasonable value of care and
lodging. The purchaser may also be awarded court costs and reasonable
attorney fees. The purchaser has one year after discovery of the conduct
to bring an action.39 The New Mexico statute specifically places some
enforcement authority in the Attorney General. He may, upon reason-
able belief of violations of the act, bring an act in the name of the state
alleging the violations. He may seek temporary or permanent injunctive
relief and restitution, and if the court finds a willful violation of the Con-
tinuing Care Act, it may assess a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand
dollars per violation.'
The Minnesota statute is the most comprehensive of the disclosure-
only filing states which place no supervisory authority in the filing
agency. The civil remedies provided for are similar to those in the New
Mexico statute."1 Unlike the New Mexico statute, the Minnesota law
makes violation of its provisions a criminal act, subject to a $20,000 fine
and one year imprisonment.4 2 An important feature of the Minnesota
law is that every resident is given a lien on the real and personal property
of the provider or facility, to secure the obligations of the provider pursu-
ant to existing and future contracts of continuing care. The lien is effec-
tive for ten years and may be foreclosed upon the liquidation of the
facility on the insolvency or bankruptcy of the provider, and in that event
the proceeds shall be used in full or partial satisfaction of obligations of
the provider pursuant to contracts for continuing care then in effect.43
In North Carolina, as stated earlier, the Division of Facility Services of
the Department of Human Resources, with which the disclosure state-
'ments must be filed, is a depository only, with no powers of supervision
over a provider. The civil liability stated in the law is like that of New
Mexico, except that the statute of limitations is three years from the date
of the execution of the contract.' Willful violation of the statute is a
misdemeanor and can result in a fine of not more than ten thousand dol-
lars, imprisonment for one year, or both.4" The Attorney General is em-
powered to make public or private investigations within or outside the
state of violations or possible violations." Whenever it appears to either
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-17-9 (1978 and Supp. 1986).
40. Id at § 24-17-10.
41. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80D.13 (West 1986).
42. Id. at § 80D.16.
43. Id. at § 80D.08.
44. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-221 (1988).
45. Id. at § 131E-224.
46. Id. at § 131E-222.
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the Attorney General or any district attorney, upon complaint or other-
wise, that any person has engaged or is about to engage in a violation of
the statute, that officer may seek a restraining order or a temporary or
permanent injunction. A court may also appoint a receiver or conserva-
tor for the provider or the provider's assets.47
The disclosure provisions48 of the North Carolina statute are compre-
hensive and compare favorably with those of any other state. The pro-
vider, prior to entering into a contract with a prospective resident, must
file with the Division a current disclosure statement.49 This same state-
ment must be provided the prospective resident prior to, or at the time
of, entering into a contract with or accepting money or other property
from or on behalf of the prospective resident.5 0
The disclosure statement must identify the provider by name and busi-
ness address and indicate whether the provider is a partnership, corpora-
tion or some other type of legal entity.5 It must also include the names
and business addresses of the officers, directors, trustees, managing or
general partners as well as any person having a ten percent or greater
equity or beneficial interest in the provider and any person who will be
managing the facility on a day-to-day basis, and a description of these
persons' interests in or occupations with the provider. 2
The disclosure statement requires quite detailed information on all the
persons identified in the preceding paragraph. This includes a descrip-
tion of their business experience in the operation or management of simi-
lar facilities.5" It requires the disclosure of the name and address of any
legal entity which will provide goods, leases or services to the provider of
a value of or greater than five hundred dollars in a year and in which any
of the identified persons have a ten percent or greater interest or which
entity has a ten percent or greater interest in the person. The goods,
leases or services must be described and their probable or anticipated
costs indicated or a statement that the cost cannot presently be
estimated. 4
The legal history of the above-indicated persons must be supplied for
each person who has (1) been convicted of a felony or pleaded nolo con-
tendere to a felony charge, or been held liable or enjoined in a civil action
by final judgment, if the felony or civil judgment involved fraud, embez-
zlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of property; or (2) is
47. Id. at § 131E-223.
48. Id. at § 131E-217.
49. Id. at § 131E-216.
50. Id. at § 131E-217(a).
51. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(1).
52. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(2).
53. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(3)(a).
54. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(3)(b).
7
Groves: The Law of Continuing Care Facilities in North Carolina
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1988
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
subject to a currently effective injunctive or restrictive court order, or
within the past five years, has had any State or federal license or permit
suspended or revoked as a result of an action brought by a governmental
agency or department, if the order or action arose out of or related to the
business activity of health care including foster care facilities, nursing
homes, retirement homes, homes for the aged in North Carolina or in
another state with a similar law. 5
The provider must indicate the nature and extent of the involvement of
any religious, charitable, or other nonprofit organization, if any, with
which the provider is afliated.56 The property of the facility existing and
proposed must be described, to include projected construction. 7 The
services to be provided must be detailed. A detailed description of all
fees must be stated. 9
Requirements as to the health and financial condition required both
for admission and continued residence must be spelled out.
60
Provisions as to reserve funding or security must be provided. This
information must disclose the establishment of escrow accounts, trusts,
or reserve funds, together with the manner in which these funds will be
invested, and the names and experience of any individuals in the direct
employment of the provider who will make the investment decisions.61
Certified financial statements of the provider must be given.62
Operators of facilities established after January 1, 1988, must provide a
summary report of an actuary, updated every five years, that estimates
the capacity of the provider to meet its contract obligations to residents.
Facilities established prior to January 1, 1988 do not need to meet this
obligation until January 1, 1993.63
If operation of the facility has not commenced, there must be a state-
ment of the anticipated source and application of the funds used or to be
used in the purchase or construction of the facility.' 4 Pro forma annual
income statements for the facility must be provided. 65 The estimated
number of residents of the facility must be stated.66
As is generally true in all the states, a copy of the standard form of
contract for continuing care used by the provider must be attached to
55. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(3)(c).
56. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(4).
57. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(5).
58. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(b).
59. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(7).
60. Idt at § 131E-217(a)(8).
61. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(9).
62. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(10).
63. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(11).
64. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(12).
65. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(13).
66. Id. at § 131E-217(a)(14).
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each disclosure statement.6 7 Terms which must be included in the con-
tract are specified. The contract may contain additional terms. The re-
quired terms include a right to rescind within thirty days of the execution
of the contract or receipt of the disclosure statement, whichever is later,6"
automatic cancellation if the resident dies prior to occupying a living unit
in the facility or is precluded on account of illness, injury or incapacity
from occupying a living unit in the facility. 9 "Living unit" is defined by
the statute as "a room, apartment, cottage, or other area within a facility
set aside for the exclusive use or control of one or more identified resi-
dents. ' 70 The contract must spell out the total consideration,71 services
to be provided,72 procedures to be followed if a change of accommoda-
tion becomes necessary for the health or safety of the resident or the
general and economic welfare of the residents, 73 policies to be imple-
mented if the resident cannot pay the periodic fees,74 refund terms,75 the
policy regarding increasing the periodic fees,76 description of the living
quarters,77 any religious or charitable affiliations of the provider and the
extent, if any, to which the affiliate organization will be responsible for
the financial and contractual obligations of the provider, 78 any property
rights of the resident,79 the policy, if any, regarding fee adjustments if the
resident is voluntarily absent from the facility, 0 and any requirement
that the resident apply for Medicaid, public assistance or any public ben-
efit program.8'
The North Carolina law also requires the filing of what is called an
"annual disclosure statement revision." This statement is to be filed
within 150 days following the end of the provider's fiscal year and is to
make current the information demanded in G.S. 131E-217. The revised
disclosure statement must be made available to all residents of the
facility.82
The fourth substantive requirement of the North Carolina statute
seeks to protect the investment of the resident prior to his moving into
67. Id. at § 131E-217(c).
68. Id. at § 131E-218(a)(1).
69. Id. at § 131E-218(a)(2).
70. Id. at § 131E-215(5).
71. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(1).
72. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(2).
73. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(3).
74. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(4).
75. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(5).
76. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(6).
77. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(7).
78. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(8).
79. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(9).
80. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(10).
81. Id. at § 131E-218(b)(11).
82. Id at § 131E-219.
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the facility. The provider must place the resident's purchase payment in
an escrow account with the sum to be released to the provider when the
living unit becomes available to the resident.83 If the facility is new, the
entrance fee is not released to the provider until the aggregate entrance
fees received or receivable, plus the anticipated proceeds of any long-
term financing commitment are equal to not less than ninety percent of
the cost of constructing or purchasing, equipping and furnishing the fa-
cility plus not less than ninety percent of the funds estimated in the state-
ment of anticipated source and application of funds submitted by the
provider as part of the required disclosure statement.84
It is thus apparent that the philosophy underlying the North Carolina
statute is basically that of protecting the prospective purchaser by en-
abling him to make an informed opinion of the financial and managerial
capacity of the provider, prior to making his investment. The protection
offered to the resident past the thirty-day grace period of the contract to
withdraw is minimal, essentially limited to the right to receive the annual
disclosure statement revision.
The property interest of the resident in the real estate of the quarters
for which he has paid is unique. It is infinitely less than that of an owner
of a condominium or a cooperative, with which it is sometimes mistak-
enly compared. The typical resident of a continuing care community
purchases a bare estate for life. He cannot devise it, sell it, hypothecate it
or rent it. By the usual adhesion contract offered him, he has no role in
management. It may thus be seen that the resident has no options and
none of the attributes of real or personal property ownership, except the
right of occupancy." If management is failing, he cannot replace it; he
has no way of limiting or reducing his losses. Moreover, the provider,
with whom the resident contracts, may not even be the owner of the real
estate, which may be owned by a separate non-profit or profit entity with
which the provider has a contractual relationship.
It is the recognition of the extremely vulnerable position of these aged,
often infirm, residents that has prompted the majority of states legislating
on this subject to afford protective measures beyond those of the North
Carolina statute. The disclosure-only states proceed on the presumption
that the relationship between provider and resident, being contractual, it
is for the resident not only to assess in the first instance prior to entering
upon the contract the fiscal and managerial capabilities of the provider
but then to take his chances that his future is secure to the date of his
death, however long that may be.
83. Id. at § 131E-220(a)(1).
84. Id. at § 131E-220(a)(2).
85. It was noted earlier that some providers, for a much higher initial purchase price, may offer
a resident a partial or total refund of the entrance fee, if he chooses to leave the facility. Many
providers offer no such option.
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An obvious point of beginning for a state that would extend protection
to this growing group of citizens beyond the limited range of the North
Carolina statute is to require a license or permit to engage in the business
of a continuing care provider. While North Carolina's disclosure-only
statute places the entire burden on the prospective purchaser of evaluat-
ing the financial and managerial capacities of the provider, the licensing
states share this burden. Although many of the licensing states are care-
ful to include a disclaimer in their license that its issuance does not con-
stitute approval, recommendation or endorsement of the provider,86
nevertheless the agency customarily makes a close initial analysis of the
financial and other capabilities of the provider 7 and may deny the appli-
cation for a license. 8 In Colorado the commissioner of insurance makes
a determination of the financial soundness of the provider.8 9
Any discussion with residents of a continuing care community will re-
veal that their concerns fall in only three categories. The first, and over-
riding one, is the continued financial stability of the provider. Second,
and closely related to the first, is that services be maintained at the prom-
ised level. The third is that management be responsive to their various
concerns. Licensing states have addressed all of these issues. Indeed, an
examination of their statutes reveals that in addition to the issues ad-
dressed in the North Carolina disclosure statute, the three mentioned
subjects are the only substantive ones found in the licensing statutes,
which may, of course, deal with them in various ways.
It was noted earlier that the North Carolina statute requires that the
resident's purchase payment be placed in escrow until a living-unit be-
comes available to him. And the North Carolina statute seeks to ensure,
at the beginning of the facility's operations, that it be financially sound.
All but three of the states90 require some evidence of the financial sound-
ness of the enterprise prior to opening. A smaller number, eleven,91 re-
quire, in the case of an on-going facility, that the resident's entrance fee
be placed in escrow until he takes up residence.
A number of statutes also seek to ensure financial stability after the
opening of the facility. A common provision applicable when the pro-
vider owns the real estate is. a requirement that an amount be kept in
86. Kg., Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726, § 16 (Vernon 1987).
87. Kg., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.023 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
88. Eg., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-103 (1985).
89. Id
90. The states Kansas, New Mexico, and Oregon do not require any evidence of financial
soundness prior to opening.
91. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1804 (Supp. 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-104 (1985); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-539 (West 1988); Ind. Code Ann. § 23-2-4-10 (Burns Supp. 1987); La. Rev.
Stat. § 51:2177 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. Stat. § 376.940 (Vernon Supp. & 1988); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 52:27D-342 (West Supp. 1987); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:10 (Supp. 1988); N.M. Stat. § 24-
17-6 (1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-220 (1988); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 3212 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
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escrow which equals the aggregate principal and interest payments due
during the next twelve months on account of any first mortgage or other
long-term financing arrangement.92 Connecticut includes rental or lease
payments for one year to the enumeration of principal and interest pay-
ments.93 California has a twelve-month requirement similar to that of
Connecticut.94 Florida has a twelve-month reserve provision for mort-
gage and leasehold payments.95
Many of the states require an operating reserve for expenses other than
those connected with mortgage or rental payments. There is great vari-
ance among the states as to these provisions. The Connecticut require-
ment is the most modest. It mandates maintenance of an escrow sum
equal to the cost of operations of the facility for a one-month period.9 6
The New Hampshire requirement is two months.97
California has a provision that may be compared to that of Arizona,
noted supra.98 For this security requirement the base measurement of
coverage is the obligation assumed under all continuing care agreements
and the reserve must be in an amount not less than the sum computed in
accordance with the standard of valuation based upon a modem mortal-
ity table selected by the Department of Insurance. 9 The Colorado re-
serve requirement specifies that the reserves shall be equivalent to sixty-
five percent of the amount of any advance deposit, entrance fee, or other
lump-sum initial payment made by each resident of the facility. The de-
posit shall then be amortized for the purposes of these reserves over the
first five-year period of each such resident's residency, on a straight-line
basis, but at no time during the period of an agreement shall the reserves
be less than thirty percent of the original reserve requirement."°°
There are other devices that some of the states have used to seek to
protect the investment of the residents. Until 1982 California gave the
State Department of Social Services power to require a bond of any appli-
cant for a certificate of authority to operate a continuing care facility.
The bond was for the use and benefit of all persons who may have been
injured or aggrieved by the failure of the provider to perform its obliga-
tions. The provision permitted any injured or aggrieved person to bring
92. Eg., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1806 (Supp. 1987); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:8 (Supp.
1988); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-339 (West & Supp. 1988); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 § 3204 (Purdon
Supp. 1987); Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726 § 9 (Vernon 1987); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8009 (Supp.
1988); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111-1/2 4160-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988), substitutes six months for
twelve.
93. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-540(a) (West Supp. 1988).
94. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1774-4 (West Supp. 1988).
95. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.035(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
96. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-540(a) (West Supp. 1988).
97. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:8 (Supp. 1988).
98. See infra, note 91.
99. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1775 (West Supp. 1988).
100. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-107(1) (1985).
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suit on the bond in his own name and without an assignment."'
Indiana has a unique approach to the security question. It has estab-
lished a retirement home guaranty fund. Each contracting party to a
continuing care agreement is assessed a fee of one hundred dollars, which
is collected by the provider and forwarded to the securities commis-
sioner, who sends the money on to the state treasurer. Here the fund,
with any income from it, is held in trust. In the event of the bankruptcy
or termination of a home, a distribution is made from the fund, up to
one-half its aggregate amount, to the living residents affected by the
bankruptcy or termination. The amount is prorated to each resident in a
sum calculated to compensate his loss. A board of directors, established
to administer the fund, is composed of one provider, two residents, one
person with expertise in insurance and one with expertise in banking and
finance. The board is appointed by the governor. The securities commis-
sioner is an ex-officio member of the board. 102
To attempt to ensure that a provider remains fiscally sound, some
states take steps in addition to mandating reserves. In many states, the
licensing authority has the power to make periodic examinations and au-
dits of the provider. 03 Florida even gives to any interested party the
right to request an inspection of the records and related financial affairs
of a provider."° The licensing agency may promulgate rules and regula-
tions to effectuate its purposes.10 5 Maine requires a provider to conform
its investment strategy to the standards adopted by the superintendent of
insurance. 106
An additional protection for residents afforded by nine states is to give
them a lien on the provider's property. Arizona's statute states that the
director of the department of insurance shall, as a condition to granting a
permit to an applicant record with the county recorder of any county a
notice of lien against the facility's land and improvements on behalf of all
residents who enter into life care contracts with the applicant to secure
performance of the provider's obligations to residents pursuant to life
care contracts. From the time of such recording there exists a lien for an
amount equal to the reasonable value of services to be performed under a
life care contract in favor of each resident on the land and improvements
101. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1773 (West 1979), repealed by c. 840 p. 3168 § 2 (West Supp.
1988).
102. Ind. Code Ann. § 23-2-4-13 to 23-2-4-18 (Bums 1984).
103. See e-g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1809 (Supp. 1987); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1782
(West 1979); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-110 (1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.105 (West 1984); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6222 (Supp. 1988); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 3218 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Tex.
Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726 § 16 (Vernon 1987).
104. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.111 (West 1984).
105. See ag., Aria. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1810 (Supp. 1987); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1781
(West 1979).
106. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6219 (Supp. 1987).
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of the facility's properties owned by the provider. The liens provided for
are preferred to all encumbrances attaching subsequently to the time the
lien is recorded and are preferred to all unrecorded encumbrances. The
lien may be foreclosed by civil action. °7 Quite similar language is found
in the statute of Colorado. 108 In Pennsylvania filing of the lien is not a
condition of granting the license. Rather, the commissioner of insurance
may at any time he determines it to be in the best interests of residents,
file a lien on both the real and personal property of the provider to secure
the obligations of the provider pursuant to existing and future contracts
of continuing care.1 9 The New Hampshire provision is similar, without
the reference to existing and future contracts. 11° The Pennsylvania lien
may, however, be foreclosed only upon the liquidation, insolvency or
bankruptcy of the provider. It is subordinate to a first mortgage on the
real property."' New Jersey has a similar provision."' In Florida, "'
Texas,' 14 and Minnesota" 5 the lien attaches as a matter of law without
recordation. In all three the lien attaches to both real and personal prop-
erty of the provider and in all three enforcement of the lien only arises
upon the liquidation, insolvency or bankruptcy of the provider. In both
Florida and Texas the lien is subordinate to first mortgages on the real
property. The Minnesota statute does not describe the lien as
subordinate. The language of the California statute differs from that of
any of the other states. It says that when necessary to secure the per-
formance of all obligations of the certificate holder to one who has trans-
ferred or promised to transfer money or property to the provider
pursuant to a life contract, the State Department of Social Services may
record with the recorder of any county a notice of lien on behalf of the
transferors. From the time of recording, there exists a lien on all real
property of the provider, not otherwise exempt, and located within the
county of recording. The filing of a bond can effectuate release of the
lien." 6 Vermont's provision is like that of New Jersey." 7
In 1987 Florida amended its law to provide that all funds deposited in
an escrow account shall generally not be subject to any liens or charges
by the escrow agent or judgments, garnishments, or creditors' claims
107. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1805 (Supp. 1987).
108. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-106 (1987).
109. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3211 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
110. N.H. Rev. Stat Ann. § 420-D:9 (Supp. 1988).
111. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3211 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
112. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-341 (West Supp. 1987).
113. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.071 (West Supp. 1987).
114. Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726, § 10 (Vernon 1987).
115. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80D.08 (West 1986).
116. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1772 (West Supp. 1988). 1988 Supp. with amendment deleted
this sentence from the statute. Lien can be released by proof of complete performance of all obliga-
tions of transferors or if state department deems the lien no longer necessary to secure performance.
117. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8004 (Supp. 1988).
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against the provider or facility.' 18
The ultimate fear of residents is the insolvency of the provider. There
have, in fact, been a number of examples around the country to justify
these fears.1 9 The laws of a number of the states provide for state inter-
vention before insolvency has occurred, when the provider appears to be
in financial difficulty. In Arizona the director of insurance can apply,
through the attorney general, to the superior court for an order directing
him to assume management and possession of the provider's facility in an
attempt at financial rehabilitation. 20 In Colorado the commissioner of
insurance has the same remedial powers as in the instances of insurance
company delinquencies.' 2 ' In these and other states, action by the state
agency may be triggered by the report of an escrow agent, auditor or any
other source of information satisfactory to the state authority. In Minne-
sota any resident or association of residents may apply to a state district
court or to federal bankruptcy court, if it has taken jurisdiction over the
provider, for an order directing the appointment of a trustee to attempt
to rehabilitate the provider.'22 A resident may also petition for the ap-
pointment of a receiver in Wisconsin.'23 Provisions for the state to as-
sume authority to attempt to rehabilitate a failing provider can also be
found in California,' 24 Connecticut, 2 ' Indiana,'
26 New Hampshire, 127
New Jersey, 128 Pennsylvania 129 and Texas,'l 0 and Vermont.' 3 '
Of course, rehabilitation may not be successful. All of the above-
named states, except Indiana and New Jersey, provide for liquidation of
the provider with the statutory provision usually appearing in the same
section setting out the conditions for the attempt at rehabilitation. Some
of these states have particular provisions seeking to protect the residents.
California states that obligations pursuant to life care agreements exe-
cuted by a provider shall be deemed a preferred claim against all assets
owned by the provider in the event of liquidation. 3 2 Florida states that
these are preferred claims but are subordinate to certain statutorily de-
118. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.033(d) (West Supp. 1987).
119. See, eg., Fisher, Continuing Care Retirement Communities: A Promise Falling Short, 8
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 47 (1985).
120. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1808(C) (Supp. 1987).
121. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-109 (1985).
122. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80D.11(1) (1985).
123. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 647.06 (West Supp. 1987).
124. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1785 (West 1979).
125. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-547 (West Supp. 1988).
126. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-4-21 (Burns 1984).
127. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:16 (Supp. 1988).
128. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-346 (West Supp. 1987).
129. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3216 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
130. Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726 § 12 (Vernon 1987).
131. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8004 (Supp. 1988).
132. Cal. Health and Safety Code, § 1777 (West 1979).
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fined priority and secured claims.1 33 The New Hampshire provision is
similar.' Pennsylvania states that the commissioner of insurance shall
give due consideration to the welfare of the residents and to this end the
proceeds of any lien obtained by the commissioner pursuant to the act
may be used in full or partial payment of entrance fees, used on behalf of
residents of a facility being liquidated or paid to other facilities operated
by providers. 35 The Texas statute provides that upon liquidation, the
court shall consider the manner in which the welfare of persons who
have previously contracted with the provider for continuing care at the
facility may be best served. In furtherance of this objective, the proceeds
of any lien imposed by the act may be used in full or partial payment of
entrance fees to other facilities.136 The New Hampshire statute tracks
the Texas language.
137
It is, of course, possible that a provider might elect to sell its interest in
the facility, an act which could be to the decided disadvantage of resi-
dents. The issues of their relationship to, and the obligations of, the new
provider can be exceedingly problematic. Eight of the states have ad-
dressed this possibility. The Virginia statute states that no provider and
no person or entity owning a provider shall sell or transfer, directly or
indirectly, more than fifty percent of the ownership of the provider or of
a continuing care facility without giving the Insurance Commission writ-
ten notice of the sale or transfer at least thirty days prior to the consum-
mation of the sale or transfer.138 California states that a holder of a
certificate of authority who wishes to sell or transfer ownership of a facil-
ity that has life care residents to another party, shall first obtain approval
from the State Department of Social Services. 139 The Pennsylvania pro-
vision is comparable."4 The Maine provision states that any provider
desiring to sell or transfer ownership of a continuing care facility shall
notify the Superintendent of Insurance and the acquiring interest shall
obtain the Superintendent's advance approval of the sale or transfer.
14 '
The New Hampshire 42 and Vermont 43 provisions are similar. The cer-
tificate of authority is nontransferable. In Maine the new owner must
apply for a new certificate of authority to continue to provide continuing
133. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.071 (West Supp. 1988). But see text at note 113.
134. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:16 (Supp. 1988).
135. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3216 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
136. Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 726 § 12 (Vernon 1987).
137. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:16 (Supp. 1988).
138. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-4906 (1986).
139. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1787 (West 1979).
140. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3206 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
141. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6216 (Supp. 1987).
142. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:13 (Supp. 1988).
143. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8003 (Supp. 1988).
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care at the facility." Colorado provides that no certificate of authority
shall be transferable; and no provider shall sell or transfer ownership of
the facility, or enter into a contract with a third-party service provider
for management of the facility, unless the commissioner of insurance ap-
proves such transfer or contract.'45 The Rhode Island provision is simi-
lar to that of Virginia, except that notice is to the Department of Health.
The statute also adds a proviso that the department must be notified of
any change in the provider's chief executive officer or managing firm.
1 46
While concern about the continuing fiscal stability of the provider is by
far the most important to the resident, there is also a natural concern
that the facility provide the promised services and amenities. To this
end, it is vital that the resident be heard by management. One not infre-
quently encounters an unexpected reticence, even fear, on the part of
many residents to confront management. It is not the purpose of this
paper to attempt a psychological analysis of these fears. Reason suggests
that they are related to age, physical infirmity, ill health, a feeling of
aloneness and vulnerability that afflicts many who have severed ties with
friends, church, community, property and perhaps family to move to the
facility. Some state statutes have taken cognizance of these facts. The
need may seem odd in a nation governed by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, but eight states have seen the value of provid-
ing to residents a specific right of self-organization. The Vermont14 7 and
Pennsylvania1 48 statutes provide that residents shall have the right of
self-organization. The Virginia statue adds that no retaliatory conduct
shall be permitted against any resident for membership or participation
in a residents' organization. 49 The Rhode Island provision is similar.150
New Jersey adds to the Virginia language that there shall be no retalia-
tion for the resident's lawful efforts to secure or enforce his rights under
the continuing care agreement, the laws of the state or of the United
States, or for the resident's good faith complaint to a governmental au-
thority of the provider's alleged violation of any state regulation or
law." 1 Louisiana not only states the right of self-organization but adds
that the resident has a right to be represented by an individual of his own
choosing.152 The New Hampshire Statute is similar. 53
In recognition of the fact that management may not convey residents'
144. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 24-A, § 6216 (Supp. 1987).
145. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-13-103(4) (1985).
146. R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-59-7 (Supp. 1985).
147. Vt Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 8011 (Supp. 1988).
148. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3215(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
149. Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-965(A)(1985).
150. R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-59-11(A) (Supp. 1985).
151. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:270-345 (Supp. 1988).
152. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2180 (West Supp. 1988).
153. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-D:15 (Supp. 1988).
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concerns to the governing body, several states command the board of
directors of the provider to hold quarterly meetings with the residents.
Such a provision is found in Florida, which further commands a free
discussion including, but not limited to, income, expenditures, financial
trends and problems of the facility and policies, programs and serv-
ices.154 To give added meaning to these meetings, in Florida any inter-
ested party may request an inspection of the records and related financial
affairs of the provider.155 New Jersey provides for quarterly meetings
with residents,156 as does Pennsylvania,157 Virginia, 5 8 and Rhode Is-
land. 59 Louisiana requires that the board of directors meet annually
with the residents.1 60 Missouri requires that one member of the board of
directors of the provider be a resident.161 Michigan requires that one
member of the board be a resident and further requires that he be elected
by the other residents. However, his role is advisory only.162 Michigan
also requires that any dispute between a resident and the facility be sub-
mitted to binding arbitration. 63
Minnesota has, perhaps, the most detailed statement of residents' asso-
ciational rights, although not all the rights listed in other statutes are
included. The residents' right to form an association is stated. If so re-
quested by the residents' association, the provider must present its an-
nual budget to the association for comment before its adoption; and the
provider must give the association monthly statements of current income
and expense showing year-to-date relationship for a deviation from the
budget. The association or its representatives may comment on, or raise
questions about, the monthly statement to the provider."
Nearly all states mandate a right of rescission of the contract, often
reciprocal, within a brief time after its making. The North Carolina
thirty day period is typical.165 Maine gives the resident one year to re-
scind.' 66 Florida gives either party the right of cancellation anytime
upon thirty days notice.167 Minnesota gives the resident only the right to
terminate at any time, without the payment of any fees for termination.
The statute states that the terms and provisions for reimbursement must
154. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.085 (West 1984).
155. Id. at § 651.111.
156. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-345 (Supp. 1988).
157. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3215(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
158. Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-965(B) (1985).
159. R.I. Gen. Laws § 23.59-11(B) (Supp. 1985).
160. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2181 (West Supp. 1988).
161. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 376-950 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
162. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 554-812 (West 1988).
163. Id. at § 554-811.
164. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80D.20 (West 1986).
165. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-218(a)(1) (Supp. 1987).
166. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 6210 (Supp. 1987).
167. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.055(1)(g) (West 1984).
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be stated in the residency agreement, but the statute does not mandate its
terms.
168
Finally, six states, perhaps in recognition of the complexity, not to say
gravity, of many of the issues surrounding continuing care communities
have created boards or committees to advise the state concerning them.
California has a Committee on Life Care Contracts of the State Social
Services Advisory Board composed of eight members. These include
three representatives of nonprofit providers, a business person with five
years experience managing health care facilities, a certified public ac-
countant, an actuary and a senior citizen. 169 Florida has a Continuing
Care Advisory Council to the Department of Insurance. Its nine mem-
bers are appointed by the governor. Three of them are administrators of
continuing care facilities, one is a business person whose expertise is in
management, one is a certified public accountant, one an attorney, one a
member of the financial community and two are residents. 170 The Con-
necticut statute mandates an advisory committee and suggests, but does
not require, particular qualifications in the advisors; nor does it prescribe
the size of the committee.17 1 The Maryland statute, recognizing that at
some point many of the residents may need a guardian, which by the
entrance contract may be the provider, created a Guardianship Advisory
Board. It is appointed by the Director on Aging. The size of the Board
is not prescribed, but one member must be an attorney, one a physician
and one who is neither an attorney nor physician. 172 Louisiana created a
Continuing Care Advisory Council, whose seven members include two
experienced administrators of providers, one representative each of the
business and financial communities, a certified public accountant, an at-
torney and a resident.1 73 The New Hampshire Advisory Council of nine
members, has two administrators of facilities, a representative from the
business community and one from the financial community, a certified
public accountant, a lawyer, and three public members, all appointed by
the governor. There are also three ex-officio members: the insurance
commissioner, the director of the division of elderly and adult services,
and the ombudsman.174
CONCLUSION
North Carolina's enactment of a disclosure type of continuing care
statute is certainly a step towards protection of the rights of residents of
168. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80D.07 (West 1986).
169. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1791 (West 1979).
170. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 651.121 (West 1984).
171. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-550 (West 1988).
172. Md. Ann. Code art. 70B § 24 (1988).
173. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2187 (West Supp. 1988).
174. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 420-D:19 (Supp. 1988).
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continuing care communities. It provides considerable help in enabling
a prospective resident to make an informed decision prior to entering
into a contract with a provider. But by limiting the statute only to dis-
closure, North Carolina does not join the main stream of the majority of
states with legislation in this field. North Carolina's statute places the
total burden of attempting to protect his investment and his future on the
prospective resident, aged, often infirm. North Carolina, unlike a major-
ity of the states, gives almost no protection to the resident. It does not
surround what is, in effect, a contract of insurance with the protections
long recognized as essential in this field. It offers no aid to residents who
are, by definition, with each passing day, less able to cope with the vagar-
ies and vicissitudes of life.
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